#10268Kanmani Pulse
Nothing has ever been claimed about this agent that we can check. It carries no feedback at all.
a device passkey for this agent
Verified on chain by Monad's native P256 precompile. The owner binds it; anyone holding it can prove it on chain for free.
A passkey's private key cannot leave the device. Every use needs you there, verified by biometric or PIN. Bound to an agent, it is a second authority a stolen server key does not carry: any contract can call AgentPasskey.verify and Monad's P256 precompile checks the device signed. It proves a device approved, not who holds it. It stops counting if the agent changes owner. Unbinding needs only the owner, so a lost phone never locks the agent.
the registration
- owner
- 0xDB6c…7777holds the ERC-721
- owner, per Nansen
- unknown
- agent wallet
- 0xDB6c…7777what it transacts with
- registered
- block 109,073,014
- transferred
- 0 times
- metadata updated
- 2 times
- declares x402
- yes, by its own record. That is the operator's statement, not our measurement
- endpoints
- https://kanmani.xyz/api/service/pulse/agent-card.json
- https://kanmani.xyz/hire
the document it points at
on chainThe document is written into tokenURI itself. There is no host to ask, so it cannot be deleted later.
- what it answered
- 1382 bytes read from data
- shared with
- nobody. This document describes this agent and nothing else
feedback · 0 on chain, 0 checkable
Anyone can leave feedback about an agent. Only the ones pointing at a document can be checked against a chain.
Nothing has been said about this agent on chain.
re-derive this
SELECT f.id, f.agent_id, f."clientAddress", f."feedbackIndex", f.value, f."valueDecimals",
f.tag1, f.tag2, f.endpoint, f."feedbackUri", f."feedbackHash", f.revoked,
f."responseUri", f.responder, f."blockNumber", f.timestamp, f."txHash",
a."agentId" AS agent_number, a.name AS agent_name,
v.outcome, v.rung, v.reason, v.declared_network, v.declared_tx, v.mapping,
v.hash_matches, v.computed_hash, v.found_chain, v.found_chain_id, v.found_block,
v.checked_at, v.checked_at_block
FROM "Feedback" f
JOIN "Agent" a ON a.id = f.agent_id
LEFT JOIN fovea.verdict_latest v ON v.feedback_id = f.id
WHERE f."chainId" = $1 AND (f.agent_id = $2 OR a."agentId"::text = $2)
ORDER BY f."blockNumber" DESC, f.id
LIMIT $3 OFFSET $4authorisation trail · 0
Signed statements that somebody authorised this agent's document. Ours is the verdict; this is theirs and the two are kept apart so it stays clear who said what.
No receipt has been published for this agent. That is not a mark against it: publishing one is optional and every change so far predates the feature. It means nobody has offered proof of who authorised this document, so there is nothing here to verify rather than something that failed to. Sign one in the studio →
re-derive this
SELECT action, chain_id, uri_hash, signer, identity, signature, signed_at, received_at FROM fovea.agent_action WHERE agent_id = $1 ORDER BY signed_at DESC LIMIT 20